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CAN THE UNITED STATES IMPOSE TRADE 
SANCTIONS ON CHINA FOR CURRENCY 
MANIPULATION? 
DANIEL C.K. CHOW* ABSTRACT	
Anti-China critics argue that the People’s Republic of China (PRC or 
China) engages in a long-standing and intentional pattern of currency 
manipulation that artificially devalues the Chinese currency, the Renminbi 
(RMB or “people’s currency”) versus the USD. The devaluation of the 
RMB makes Chinese goods less expensive to the U.S. consumer as they 
need to exchange fewer dollars for the same amount of RMB used to 
purchase Chinese imported goods. At the same time, U.S. goods are more 
expensive to the Chinese consumer as they need to use more RMB to 
exchange for the same amount of USD needed to purchase U.S. goods. 
This devaluation of the Chinese currency results in China exporting more 
goods to the United States and the United States exporting fewer to China. 
This pattern leads to an increase in the U.S. trade deficit with China, 
which has already reached a massive $319.28 billion in 2015, by far the 
largest U.S. trade deficit with any individual trading partner. A trade 
deficit of this size has many negative consequences for the United States, 
such as closed factories, lost jobs, and stagnant wages.  
China’s currency manipulation is another instance, according to the 
anti-China critics, of how China conducts international trade to the 
detriment of the United States. One of the most prominent anti-China 
critics, newly-elected President Donald Trump, promises to impose 
punitive tariffs of 45% on all Chinese imports to offset the effects of 
China’s currency manipulation. Should such a measure become enacted, it 
would cause shock waves around the world and could possibly plunge the 
world into a trade war between the United States and China with costly 
ramifications for every corner of the globe.  
This article examines the main arguments that China’s currency 
manipulation justifies the U.S. imposition of trade sanctions. A detailed 
legal analysis reveals that China’s currency manipulation violates no 
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legal obligations under the World Trade Organization, hereinafter 
referred to as "WTO." As a result, the United States cannot lawfully 
impose trade sanctions on China consistent with the WTO. If the United 
States imposes such sanctions, China will likely be able to successfully 
challenge the sanctions in the WTO and win a WTO decision requiring the 
United States to withdraw the sanctions. The article then argues that a 
different set of strategies is needed to deal with China’s sharp tactics in 
international trade, as exemplified in the United States’ recent strategy in 
creating mega-free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. TABLE	OF	CONTENTS		
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Critics argue that the United States should impose trade sanctions on 
all imports from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) due 
to unfairly low prices caused by China’s currency manipulation.1 These 
arguments have raged on for at least a decade2 in political circles in the 
United States and have served as the basis for several unsuccessful 
attempts at national legislation3 that could have led to import sanctions on 
China. Calls for sanctions on China seem to reemerge with renewed vigor 
and bellicosity in every presidential or other high office election cycle, 
including last year’s, when the tone became even more strident than 
usual.4 Trade sanctions on China may have a certain superficial populist 
appeal especially in the heat of a political campaign by appealing to 
masses of workers feeling left behind by China’s economic ascendancy, 
but do these arguments used by ambitious politicians withstand the test of 
vigorous legal analysis? The purpose of this article is to examine whether 
these arguments for trade sanctions are consistent with the legal 
requirements of the World Trade Organization, hereinafter referred to as 
"WTO," the basic legal framework that governs all trade in goods between 
WTO members, including China and the United States.5 If these 
arguments cannot withstand a rigorous legal analysis, they should be 
abandoned and new strategies should be pursued. 
The basic argument is that the devaluation of China’s currency, the 
 
 
 1. See House Overwhelming Passes Trade Sanctions Bill Aimed at China, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 29, 2010, 11:20 PM),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/29/house-china-trade-
sanctions-bill-passed_n_744688.html (bill authorizes trade sanctions against China for currency 
manipulations). 
 2. See Stephen S. Roach, China’s Currency Manipulation: A Policy Debate, WORLD AFFAIRS 
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china’s-currency-manipulation-policy-
debate-0 (noting that the first trade bill proposed against Chinese currency manipulation was proposed 
in 2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, H.R. 2378, 111th Congress (2009) (requiring 
the Department of Commerce to investigate foreign government currency practices as a 
countervailable subsidy); Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, S. 1269, 114th 
Congress (2015) (requiring the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation if an interested party 
petitions for an investigation); American Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act, H.R. 2523, 114th 
Congress (2015) (attempting to loosen requirements and standards related to countervailing duty 
investigations); and Currency Undervaluation Investigation Act, S. 433, 114th Congress (2015) (also 
requiring the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation if an interested party petitions for an 
investigation). With the exception of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, none 
of these pieces of legislation passed into law. 
 4. See Gabby Morrongiello, Donald Trump Wants a 45 percent Tax on Chinese Imports, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Jan. 17, 2016, 2:17 PM),  http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-wants-a-45-
percent-tax-on-chinese-imports/article/2579850 (45% tax is a response to China’s currency 
manipulation). 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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RMB (“Renminbi” or “people’s currency”), against the U.S. dollar (USD) 
harms the United States by creating a trade distortion that benefits China 
at the expense of the United States.6 Since all goods today are purchased 
with currency—the barter system having all but disappeared—the 
currency of one country must be exchanged for foreign currency to pay for 
international sale of goods in all export-import transactions.7 For example, 
Chinese exporters who sell goods to the United States receive  Chinese 
currency, the RMB8  as payment for the goods. U.S. importers must 
exchange U.S. currency for RMB through China’s banks in order to pay 
for Chinese imports.9 China’s devaluation of the RMB means that fewer 
USD need to be exchanged for the same amount of RMB in the purchase 
of Chinese goods.10 As a result, U.S. consumers need to use fewer USD to 
purchase the same amount of Chinese goods, making Chinese goods less 
expensive to the U.S. consumer.11 Cheaper Chinese goods increase 
demand, so Chinese imports into the United States also increase.12 By 
contrast, for the Chinese consumer the effect of the devaluation of the 
RMB against the USD is the opposite: more RMB need to be exchanged 
for the same amount of USD, making U.S. goods more expensive to the 
Chinese consumer.13 More expensive U.S. goods will drive down demand, 
so fewer U.S. goods will be imported into China.14 The overall effect of 
this devaluation is that U.S. consumers will purchase more goods from 
China, and Chinese consumers will purchase fewer goods from the United 
States.15 In other words, China will sell more goods to the United States 
 
 
 6. See Carlos Tejada, Five Things to Know About China’s Currency Devaluation, WALL ST. J.: 
L. BLOG  (Aug. 11, 2015, 11:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/08/10/5-things-about-chinas-
currency-devaluation/. 
 7. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 44 (2d ed. 2012). 
 8. See id. at 45. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See COLLINS DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS (C. Pass ed., 3d ed. 2005), for the definition of 
devaluation. 
 11. See id.  
 12. See id.; see also Adam J. Flood, In Supporting the National Export Initiative, Do the 
Commerce Departments Proposed Changes to Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Laws 
Truly Implement a Global Initiative or Art they an Isolated Enforcement?, 19 CURRENTS: INT’L 
TRADE L.J. 25, 35 (stating that undervaluing of the Chinese currency results in less expensive Chinese 
goods for U.S. consumers while driving up the price of American made goods. Therefore, the demand 
for the cheaper Chinese goods over U.S. made goods increases.) 
 13. See id; see also Duncan Hewitt, How Will China’s Yuan Devaluation Affect Chinese 
Consumers’ Taste For Imported Goods?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/how-will-chinas-yuan-devaluation-affect-chinese-consumers-taste-imported-
goods-2052203.  
 14. See Flood, supra note 12. 
 15. See Flood, supra note 12. 
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and the United States will sell less to China.16 
From a trade perspective, currency manipulation further enlarges the 
U.S. trade deficit with China17 and conversely increases the Chinese trade 
surplus with the United States.18 In 2015, the U.S. trade deficit reached a 
record $365.7 billion.19 A breakdown of this figure indicates that the 
United States sold $116.2 billion in exports to China while purchasing 
$481.9 billion imports (nearly one half trillion dollars) from China.20 In 
other words, China is earning $365.7 billion more in trade with the United 
States than the United States is earning with China. In even more stark 
terms, China is becoming $365.7 billion richer in trade with the United 
States every year while the United States is losing the same amount in 
trade with China. Of course, the United States receives social benefits in 
the form of consumption and presumably happier consumers, but the 
overall economic relationship is that the United States is falling further 
and further behind in its trading relationship with China. Critics also argue 
that the influx of Chinese made goods displaces U.S. made goods, leading 
to the loss of millions of U.S. jobs and to the lowering of wages for jobs 
that remain.21  
As China generates more and more revenue from the United States, 
China is growing richer and more powerful economically vis-à-vis the 
United States. Moreover, rather than using this extra revenue to purchase 
more U.S. goods and reciprocating in trade with the United States by 
buying U.S. made goods, China is instead “hoarding” by using the revenue 
earned to purchase U.S. treasury bonds from the United States 
government.22 Bonds are debt instruments of the United States 
government, so China is in essence lending money to the United States. As 
the U.S. bond represents a share of the U.S. economy, China owns more 
 
 
 16. See COLLINS DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS, supra note 10; see also Julie Makinen and 
Samantha Masunaga, Why China’s Devaluation of the Yuan Matters so Much, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2015, 9:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-china-devalues-yuan-20150811-htmlstory.html.  
 17. See C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the 
Global Economic Order, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2012),  
https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/currency-manipulation-us-economy-and-global-economic-
order.   
 18. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
 19. See Terence P. Jeffrey, $365,694,500,000: U.S. Merchandise Trade Deficit With China Hit 
Record in 2015, CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2016, 12:54 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-
jeffrey/365694500000-merchandise-trade-deficit-china-hit-record-2015. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Danielle Kurtzleben, Report: U.S. Lost 2.7 Million Jobs to China in 10 Years, U.S. NEWS 
(Aug. 24, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/24/report-america-lost-27-
million-jobs-to-china-in-10-years (citing currency manipulation as one cause of job loss and lower 
wages). 
 22. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 46. This is another way of saying that China is saving its earnings 
instead of spending them. 
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and more of the United States.23  
China loans to the United States by buying U.S. government bonds, 
which gives the United States more money to spend and allows the United 
States to avoid painful measures such as raising revenue through 
increasing taxes on consumers.24 China’s loans to the United States are of 
unprecedented historic proportions. China held $1.24 trillion in U.S. 
Treasury securities in 2014,25 while the U.S. Gross National Product in 
2015 was $18.496 trillion.26 China now owns 20.6% of all U.S. Treasury 
securities as of June 2015.27 By one measure, China owns 14% of the 
annual American economy. In plain terms, the United States is indebted to 
China for $1.24 trillion, giving China great leverage. The United States 
faces the possibility of an economic crisis if China decides to redeem all of 
its bonds at once and demand payment. 
Perhaps even more worrisome, the extra disposable income available to 
U.S. consumers by not having to pay more taxes is not being used to save 
and invest but to buy even more cheap Chinese goods. This creates a 
never-ending cycle of increasing debt and money-borrowing from China 
that makes the United States ever more indebted to China.28 As the U.S. 
government goes into ever increasing debt with China, the U.S. 
government is also losing economic leverage to China, due to China’s 
ownership of U.S. bonds. In turn, China can become bolder in its demands 
on the United States in political matters around the world. 
Anti-China critics argue that China’s currency manipulation is a key 
tool to gain political and economic power over the United States. By 
devaluing the RMB, China is able to further gain financial and political 
power over the United States.29 These critics further charge that this type 
of currency manipulation is an unfair trade practice and that the 
devaluation of the RMB constitutes an illegal subsidy (further explained in 
the next section). The critics argue that the United States has the legal 
 
 
 23. Id. at 47-48. 
 24. Id. at 48-49.  
 25. WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 18, (2015) 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf.   
 26. See GNI (current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP. 
CD?locations=US (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).  
 27. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. 
SECURITIES 18 (2016), http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shl2015r.pdf.  
 28. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 47 (by purchasing U.S. capital assets, China is increasing the 
demand for U.S. dollars, making U.S. exports more expensive, driving down demand for U.S. exports 
and creating “an endless cycle in which the trade deficit with China continues to increase with no end 
in sight.”). 
 29. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
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right under U.S. and international trade laws to respond by the imposition 
of a countervailing duty: an additional tariff to neutralize China’s trade 
advantage.30 Newly-elected President Donald Trump has proclaimed he 
will impose additional across-the-board tariffs of 45% on all Chinese 
goods (on top of existing tariffs), which will offset the subsidy that is 
created by the currency devaluation.31 The countervailing duty will then 
help to decrease the mushrooming trade deficit.32 While similar arguments 
have been repeated with regularity for the past decade, this argument has 
taken on even more vehemence and bravado in 2016.33  
This article argues that this strategy—that the United States should 
impose trade sanctions on China for currency manipulation—cannot 
withstand rigorous legal scrutiny under the WTO.34 An analysis of the 
WTO texts indicates that trade sanctions in the form of countervailing 
duties for China’s currency manipulation are illegal.35 Moreover, as a trade 
strategy argument, the position has additional serious risks.36 The 
imposition of sanctions for currency manipulation on China could expose 
the United States to the same treatment from many of its trading partners, 
since the United States engages in what can also be considered to be 
currency manipulation by intervening in the currency markets for USD.37 
In other words, the use of trade sanctions against China for currency 
manipulation may open the door for the same treatment from China and 
other countries. This consequence alone is a strong argument for not 
imposing trade sanctions. The reasons why trade sanctions, despite their 
populist appeal, are not a viable U.S. option can be summarized as 
follows. 
First, despite the simplistic rhetoric that appeals to populist sentiments, 
China’s currency manipulation does not constitute an actionable subsidy 
under WTO law.38 In terms of administering its agreements, the WTO is a 
body that follows technical laws and regulations, not a body that follows 
policy, sentiment, or public opinion. The technical analysis of a subsidy 
under the relevant WTO rules does not encompass currency 
 
 
 30. See C. Fred Bergsten, Currency Manipulation: Why Something Must be Done, FORBES (Feb. 
25, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/02/25/currency-manipulation-why-something-
must-be-done/#209e677f31c8 (countervailing duties must be imposed to offset effects of China’s 
currency manipulation). 
 31. See Morongiello, supra note 4. 
 32. See id.; see also Bergsten, supra note 30.  
 33. See Morongiello, supra note 4. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
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manipulation.39 While currency manipulation might have some similar 
economic effects as subsidies, that argument is based on policy and not a 
valid legal argument that can successfully be presented before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)40 and the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM or SCM Agreement)41 govern the use of countervailing 
duties against illegal subsidies. Nothing in the GATT or the SCM 
Agreement encompasses currency manipulation as an actionable offense.42 
Second, some seventy years ago nations held a conference in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire near the end of the Second World War to 
establish a triumvirate of multilateral institutions to govern world trade 
and finance once the war was concluded.43 Among the institutions were a 
World Bank (to provide lending to poor countries),44 an International 
Trade Organization (ITO) (to lower barriers to trade),45 and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (to create discipline in the use of 
international exchange rates).46 The ITO never came into existence due to 
the opposition from the U.S. Congress; however, the GATT 1947 was 
established to provide a jump-start to lower tariffs in the post-war era.47 
The structure of these institutions and their legal texts indicates that it is 
the IMF, not the GATT/WTO, that is the proper institution to deal with 
exchange rates and currency manipulation.48 The most important 
consequence of this tripartite structure is that, while these institutions are 
related, the IMF and the GATT/WTO are separate legal institutions with 
their own governing structures and measures for dealing with violations or 
inconsistencies with their governing agreements, the IMF Articles of 
Association and the myriad WTO agreements.49 This has the paramount 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994) [hereinafter “GATT 1994”].  
 41. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Text: Results of the Uruguay Round 
231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter “SCM”]; see also infra Part III. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 18.  
 44. Id. at 19; see also Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941-1947, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods.  
 45. See CHOW, supra note 7 at 18; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 44. 
 46. See CHOW, supra note 7 at 19-21; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. at 18, 26-28. 
 48. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 19-21; see also infra Part IV. 
 49. See infra Part IV. 
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consequence that a violation of the articles of the IMF cannot serve as a 
basis for the imposition of trade sanctions under the GATT/WTO.50 This 
follows because the GATT/WTO and the IMF are separate legal entities 
that do not have interconnecting or dependent legal obligations.51 The IMF 
and WTO independently decide how to handle violations of their 
agreements. While the GATT/WTO and IMF work together, nothing in 
the founding articles of any of these institutions authorizes using sanctions 
under one organization (the WTO) to punish countries for violating the 
obligations of another (the IMF). This is a form of “cross-retaliation” that 
must be specifically authorized by an agreement between the two 
institutions. Of course, any “cross-retaliation” assumes that the IMF would 
find a violation, i.e. that China is a currency manipulator, a finding that the 
IMF has never made in the entire seven decades of its existence.52 If the 
United States has a complaint about China’s currency manipulation, the 
proper forum in which to raise it is in the IMF. Historically, the IMF has 
no enforcement power,53 leaving the United States few options as further 
explained below. The IMF contemplates discussions to voluntarily resolve 
currency issues. 
Third, the United States itself often intervenes in currency markets to 
buy USD to prop up the dollar and engages in other currency transactions 
for the purposes of assuring stability in the U.S. financial system.54 To be 
sure, unlike China, the United States does not peg the USD to a basket of 
foreign currencies, but China could argue the United States’ many 
monetary policies and market interventions to buy U.S. currency is also a 
form of currency manipulation subject to countervailing duties imposed by 
China on imports of U.S. made goods. Threats by the United States to 
impose countervailing duties as a remedy for currency manipulation may 
simply open up the United States to retaliation in kind from China as well 
other Asian nations. The claim that China is engaging in currency 
manipulation may lead to a series of new problems for the United States 
that might offset the advantage of imposing trade sanctions on China for 
 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Claus D. Zimmermann, Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law, 105 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 423, 455 (2011). 
 53. The IMF has the following powers: surveillance, the ability to offer technical assistance, and 
the ability to engage in research and statistics. Nothing is mentioned concerning enforcement powers. 
See What the IMF Does, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/work.htm. 
 54. See U.S. Foreign Exchange Intervention, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed44.html (discussing U.S. intervention in foreign 
currency markets when in the view of U.S. monetary authorities exchange rates do not accurately 
reflect fundamental market conditions and there is a need to slow rapidly changing exchange rate 
moves).  
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currency manipulation. 
This article will explore each of these themes in the parts that follow. 
Part II will discuss the global system of exchange rates. Part III will follow 
with a technical analysis of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement and whether currency manipulation qualifies as a 
subsidy. In Part IV, the article will discuss the role of the IMF in dealing 
with currency manipulation. Part V will discuss the slippery slope of the 
U.S. argument that currency manipulation is a subsidy and how this might 
expose the United States to the consequences of its own arguments. Part 
VI will offer some concluding observations about what possible measures 
the United States might adopt in light of China’s on-going currency 
manipulation. 
II. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF EXCHANGE RATES 
A. The Modern System of Exchange Rates  
In most international sale of goods transactions today, the buyer of 
goods pays the seller in the seller’s currency. A U.S. buyer of Chinese 
goods will need to use USD to buy RMB to pay for the goods.55 Similarly, 
a Chinese buyer of U.S. goods will use RMB to buy USD to pay for goods 
imported from the United States.56 The exchange rate for USD to RMB 
thus becomes a crucial part of the international sales transaction as it 
affects the price of the goods. 
At one time, exchange rates were fixed in accordance with the gold 
standard. One standard unit of gold was exchangeable for one bank note. 
However, when England found itself in danger of no longer being able to 
exchange gold for bank notes, it abandoned the gold standard in 1931. 
Other nations soon followed suit.57 Today, exchange rates for currencies in 
the international monetary are usually determined by a system in which 
the rates are allowed to “float” in currency exchanges, i.e., the rates are 
determined by the free market forces of supply and demand.58 For 
example, if there is a high demand for U.S. goods, then there is also a high 
demand for USD needed to purchase those goods. The demand for U.S. 
 
 
 55. See id. at 45.  
 56. See id. (discussing how RMB is used to purchase US dollars to buy goods from the United 
States). 
 57. See Jacob Goldstein and David Kestenbaum, Why We Left the Gold Standard, NPR (April 
11, 2011 4:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/04/27/135604828/why-we-left-the-gold-
standard. 
 58. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45. 
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currency will mean greater purchases of USD using foreign currency and 
the greater demand for the USD will drive up the price of the dollar vis-à-
vis foreign currencies exchanged for USD.59 The higher the demand, the 
higher the prices for USD in foreign currency will become; in other words, 
the dollar appreciates against the foreign currency.60 This means larger 
amounts of foreign currency will be needed to purchase the same amount 
of dollars needed to purchase U.S. imports of goods; as a result, U.S. 
goods become more expensive for the foreign consumer. For example, 
suppose that the exchange rate for USD to RMB is 1:6. This means that a 
consumer in the United States will obtain 6 RMB for 1 USD or that a 
Chinese consumer will need to use 6 RMB in order to obtain 1 USD. Let 
us also assume that the price of the product is 10 USD. Assuming a 1:6 
USD to RMB exchange rate, the cost to the Chinese consumer to buy the 
product is 60 RMB, which is exchanged to 10 USD that is paid to the 
account of the U.S. seller. If the product becomes popular and there is a 
high demand for it among Chinese consumers, then the high demand for 
USD will result in banks requiring more RMB to be exchanged for USD. 
As a result, USD appreciates: it becomes more expensive and the 
exchange rate might now become 1:10 USD to RMB. Now 10 RMB will 
need to be exchanged for 1 USD or the product now costs 100 RMB to the 
Chinese consumer as a result of the appreciation of the dollar. The product 
has just increased significantly in price for consumers in China, due to the 
high demand for the product and the appreciation of USD.  
The float contains a built-in self-correcting mechanism for reaching an 
equilibrium in trade balances.61 The appreciation of the USD means that 
the price of U.S. goods and services will also increase, which will tend to 
drive down demand.62 Chinese consumers who were willing to purchase 
the U.S. product for 60 RMB might balk at paying 100 RMB for the same 
product. The appreciation of the dollar might lead to less demand on the 
part of the Chinese consumer for the product and a corresponding lower 
demand for USD.63 The dollar should then depreciate as a result.64 
Similarly, the appreciation of the dollar (and the depreciation of the RMB) 
means that Chinese products become cheaper to the U.S. consumer who 
now has to pay fewer dollars to purchase the same amount of goods and 
 
 
 59. See Reem Heakal, Currency Exchange: Floating Rate vs. Fixed Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/020603.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).    
 60. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45. 
 61. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45. 
 62. See Anandi Sahu, Balance of Trade, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, http://www.referencefor 
business.com/encyclopedia/Assem-Braz/Balance-of-Trade.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).   
 63. See id.  
 64. See id.  
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services from China.65 A depreciation of the RMB from 1:6 USD to RMB 
to 1:10 USD to RMB means that a U.S. consumer who had to spend 10 
USD to purchase a Chinese product worth 60 RMB can now spend 10 
USD to purchase a Chinese product worth 100 RMB. As a result, demand 
among U.S. consumers might increase for inexpensive Chinese imports 
and the U.S. might purchase more goods and services from China as a 
result.66 The United States will begin to import more cheap Chinese 
goods.67 Over time, however, the use of dollars to purchase RMB and the 
greater demand for the RMB will then lead to the appreciation of the RMB 
in relation to the dollar; the high demand drives up the price of the RMB, 
at which point more dollars will be needed to purchase the same amount of 
RMB68 as the RMB appreciates and the USD depreciates. U.S. consumers 
will begin to buy fewer Chinese imports and the U.S. trade deficit will 
begin to decrease. The USD to RMB exchange rate might then adjust to 
perhaps back to the original rate of 16 or a similar rate. Over time, 
exchange rates tend to balance out due to supply and demand for products. 
Ultimately, supply and demand determines exchange rates, absent 
interventions in the market that create distortions. 
In the real world, changes in exchange rates affect trade balances. If 
China were to devalue its currency, the result is that its goods become less 
expensive to the U.S. consumer and the United States will then import 
more goods from China.69 At the same time, goods from the United States 
would become expensive to consumers in China and China would import 
fewer U.S. exports.70 This is the crux of the criticism by opponents of 
China’s currency manipulation: China artificially devalues its exchange 
rate in order to create or increase a favorable trade balance in China’s 
favor.71 China gains in the trading relationship with the United States by 
earning revenue and becoming wealthier while the United States spends 
more than it is earning in its trade with China, becomes less wealthy, and 
must borrow money from China to sustain its level of consumption; 
ultimately, the U.S. economy cedes to China and becomes more dependent 
on Chinese loans.72 As with any debtor who owns large sums to a creditor, 
 
 
 65. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45. 
 66. Id. at 45. 
 67. See Kim Hjelmgaard, Yuan and You: How China's Devalued Currency Affects U.S.  
Consumers, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015, 10:14 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
business/2015/08/12/yuan-and-you-how-chinas-devalued-currency-affects-us-consumers/31524925/.   
 68. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45; see also Flood, supra note 12. 
 69. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45-47; see also Flood, supra note 12. 
 70. Id. at 45-47.  
 71. See Morrongiello, supra note 4. 
 72. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 45-48. 
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the United States might need to make political concessions to China, as 
China’s increasing ownership of the United States economy gives China 
greater leverage over the United States.73 
B. China’s Refusal to Allow the RMB to Float as a Form of Currency 
Manipulation 
Floating exchange rates tend to contribute to the equilibrium in trade 
balances, but China does not allow its currency to float.74 Rather, China 
“pegs” its currency to the USD and a small basket of other international 
currencies.75 China has given a number of reasons for this approach, 
mostly based on the argument that China’s financial system is too unstable 
to be subjected to floating exchange rates.76 Rather, China sets an 
exchange rate by government fiat that it determines to be the appropriate 
rate of exchange.77 Under pressure from the United States and its other 
trade partners, China has recently allowed its currency to fluctuate within 
greater margins and to be pegged against a “basket of foreign currencies” 
containing the USD and other foreign currencies.78 However, China can 
change and lower its peg at any time. 
The core of the U.S. dissatisfaction with China’s currency system is the 
claim maintained by many economists and politicians that China’s 
currency exchange rate is consistently undervalued, reaching a peak 
undervaluation of 30-40% in 2007.79 As recently as 2013, the U.S. 
Treasury stated that the RMB was significantly undervalued, although it 
 
 
 73. Id. at 48. 
 74. Id. at 45. 
 75. See Keith Bradsher, China to Track Renminbi Based on Basket of Currencies, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/international/china-to-track-
renminbi-based-on-basket-of-currencies.html. See also, CHOW, supra note 7. At one point, China fixed 
its currency entirely to the USD but now pegs the RMB to a basket of currencies including the USD, 
the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the South Korean Won with a smaller portion of the basket consisting 
of the British pound, the Thai Baht, the Russian Ruble, and the Australian dollar. The basket is 
dominated by the USD, Euro, Japanese Yen and South Korean Won, with a smaller proportion made 
up of the British Pound, Thai Baht, Russian Ruble, Australian Dollar, Canadian Dollar and Singapore 
Dollar.  
 76. See Simon Wilson, Will China Float its Currency?, MONEYWEEK (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://moneyweek.com/currencies-china-renminbi-dollar-peg-47718/ (concerns about rising 
unemployment and inflation are reasons given by Chinese government for refusing to allow its 
currency to float). 
 77. See Bradsher, supra note 75. 
 78. The RMB was pegged exclusively to the USD until 2015. See Tim Worstall, China Drops the 
Yuan’s Strict Peg to the USD, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
timworstall/2015/12/12/china-drops-the-yuans-strict-peg-to-the-us-dollar/#2f5bfbbc461e. 
 79. See Bob Davis, Undervalue/Overvalue: The Great Yuan Debate Continues, WALL ST. J.: J. 
BLOG (May 13, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/05/13/undervalueovervalue-
the-great-yuan-debate-continues/.  
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did not identify an exact figure.80 This announcement was made before 
China enacted a 2% devaluation of the RMB in August 2015, which sent 
shock waves around the world.81 Since the Chinese government sets the 
exchange rate for the RMB, China can set the rate at below-market rates, 
which in effect devalue the currency. In other words, economists first 
calculate what the exchange rate would be if the RMB were allowed to 
float; the PRC pegged rate is then compared to the hypothetical floating or 
market rate of exchange. It can then be determined if the pegged rate is 
higher or lower than the market rate. If the pegged exchange rate is lower 
than the market rate, then China is in effect devaluing its currency.  
President Trump seems to argue that China’s official RMB exchange 
rate is 45% percent below a market exchange rate for the RMB.82 This 
means that as a result of China’s fixed currency rate, the RMB is currently 
devalued by about 45% percent. Today, China maintains an exchange rate 
of 6.65 RMB to 1 USD. Assuming a 45% devaluation, a market rate of 
exchange should be about 2.9 RMB to 1 USD. The practical effect of this 
devaluation is that U.S. consumers are buying almost 7 RMB of Chinese 
goods for 1 USD whereas they should be buying about 2.9 RMB worth of 
Chinese goods for 1 USD. A Chinese made refrigerator imported into the 
United States and priced at 5,000 RMB costs the U.S. consumer about 750 
USD at the prevailing rate of exchange but would cost 1,720 USD at the 
“real” rate of exchange without the devaluation of the RMB. Such a 
significant price difference captures the anger of anti-China critics. The 
response, at least according to President Trump, is to impose an extra tariff 
(a countervailing duty) of 970 USD on the Chinese imported refrigerator 
to neutralize the price advantage of the devaluation. This is the “real” price 
of the refrigerator based on the market rate of exchange if the rate were 
allowed to float. No doubt this massive countervailing duty will anger 
China and cause major repercussions throughout the entire global trading 
community, as China would likely seek to divert their exports that would 
have gone to the United States to other countries that will not impose 
similar duties. If these countries follow suit and impose 45% 
 
 
 80. See U.S. Treasury: Chinese Currency Still 'Significantly Undervalued,' VOA (Oct. 31, 2013, 
12:20 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-treasury-china-currency-still-significantly-
undervalued/1780475.html. 
 81. See Christopher Balding, Putting China’s 2% RMB Devaluation in Context, THE NANFANG 
(Aug. 15, 2015, 8:59 AM), https://thenanfang.com/putting-chinas-2-rmb-devaluation-in-context/ 
(arguing that the devaluation sent shock waves around the globe and portends future devaluations); see 
also Julie Makinen and Samantha Masunaga, Why China’s Devaluation of the Yuan Matters so Much, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-china-devalues-yuan-20150811-
htmlstory.html. 
 82. See Morrongiello, supra note 4.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
2017] CAN THE U.S. IMPOSE TRADE SANCTIONS ON CHINA 309 
 
 
 
 
countervailing duties on the same product to avoid a glut of Chinese 
imports diverted from the United States, a global economic slowdown 
could ensue as inventory becomes stockpiled. Note, moreover, that the 
proposal is to impose a 45% tariff on every Chinese import. The 
consequences of such a move could be greatly disruptive to world trade. 
On the flip side, anti-China critics argue that Chinese consumers are 
paying about 45% percent more for U.S. goods than they would otherwise 
have to pay if the RMB were allowed to float, so China imports fewer U.S. 
goods into China. The overall effect of the pegged rate is an increase in the 
volume of China’s imports into the United States and a decrease in the 
volume of U.S. exports to China. The pegged rate also means that the U.S. 
trade deficit with China is larger (perhaps by as much as 45% percent) 
than what it would otherwise be under a floating rate. The U.S. trade 
deficit with China has a number of harmful effects for the United States, 
including loss of jobs, factories that must be shut down because they 
cannot compete, and depressed wages for those jobs that survive.83 These 
effects are causing great anger among the general public and some 
politicians.84  
 
 
 83. See Bergsten, supra note 30. 
 84.  See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain 
China in International Trade, 17 Chi. J. Int’l L 370, 389 (2017). 
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C. Currency Devaluations as a Temporary Measure to Deal with Balance 
of Payment Problems 
Temporary currency devaluations are a common method by which 
countries that are experiencing balance of payment problems can find an 
emergency solution to avoid an economic crisis.85 A balance of payment 
problem occurs when a nation lacks foreign currency with which to pay 
debts owed to a foreign creditor.86 Suppose a country has purchased a 
large volume of imports or a nation has borrowed funds from a foreign 
country to deal with a putative national emergency.87 For various reasons, 
the borrowing nation may lack the funds to repay the loan or to pay for the 
imports.88 A key crop in the nation destined for export may have failed so 
the nation may have adopted imprudent fiscal policies,89 while problems of 
government corruption and waste may have led to the disappearance of 
funds, or the government may have used funds on wasteful and 
unproductive public works. The debtor nation tightens its belt and suffers 
austerity measures; it could print more money to pay its debts but this 
would only lead to inflation or hyperinflation, which would only worsen 
the crisis.90 Failure to repay debts in foreign currency could lead to a 
financial crisis if the nation goes into default and no other nation is willing 
to lend it funds. This could lead to famine, anarchy, chaos, and regime 
change. As a temporary measure, the nation might devalue its currency to 
stimulate exports in order to obtain foreign currency to pay off its debts 
and avoid a national disaster. This infusion of additional revenue from 
increased exports may be the temporary jolt needed to assist a country in 
the throes of an economic crisis and allow it to survive the crisis until 
other measures become available. 
China’s use of currency devaluations, however, cannot be considered 
to be a temporary measure to deal with a financial crisis, but appears to be 
a permanent feature of China’s long-term national policies. This is 
evidenced by China’s long-term use of the pegged currency rate, not as 
one time measure, but as a permanent national policy that has persisted for 
 
 
 85. For example, Argentina (and some other South American countries) regularly intervened in 
its currency markets to deal with various economic crises. See LG&E Energy Corp., et al. v. Argentine 
Republic, 46 I.L.M. 40 (2007), ICSDI Case No. ARB/02/1. In fact, Argentina’s currency and other 
financial problems were so severe that Argentina has been in a state of emergency in the twentieth 
century for greater periods than it has not.  
 86. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 20. 
 87. Id. at 20. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. Id. at 20. 
 90. Id. at 20. 
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over a decade.91 As a result, China’s U.S. currency reserves have rocketed 
to become by far the world’s largest at $3.66 trillion, more than the 
combined reserves of the four runner ups: Japan, the European Union, 
Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland.92 Chinese central banker Zhou Xiaochuan 
has admitted that China’s currency reserves have exceeded the reasonable 
level that China.93 If China is not amassing currency reserves to deal with 
balance of payment problems (the traditional reason for devaluing 
currencies to amass currency reserves), then China is engaged in using a 
long-term set of policies of foreign currency accumulation to serve other 
policy needs.  
Critics charge that currency devaluation is part of China’s mercantilist 
policies that advise economic growth through growth in exports while 
protecting the Chinese economy from import competition.94 Mercantilist 
policies promote export driven growth at the expense of trading partners.95 
An economy that derives growth from exports will need policies that 
promote exports and this is a key role played by China’s currency policies. 
A different set of PRC policies provides protection from import 
competition so the combination is a potent one: encourage exports while, 
at the same time, erect barriers to import competition to protect domestic 
industries.96 Together these two sets of PRC policies are designed to 
promote rapid economic growth of China’s industries and its economy at 
the expense of China’s competitors. China’s exports grow, supported by 
government policies, while China’s domestic industries grow protected by 
domestic policies against foreign competition.97 Both China’s export and 
domestic industries are protected by favorable government policies from 
the forces of free competition.98 Other countries that do not have the 
benefit of such interventionist government policies are unable to offer the 
same protections to their export and importing industries and cannot keep 
pace with China’s growth. 
D. Currency Manipulation and Subsidies  
 
 
 91. See Morrison, supra note 25, at 14 (noting the decade long accumulation of U.S. foreign 
currency reserves by China). 
 92. See Gwynn Guilford, China’s Central Bank now has $3.66 Trillion in Foreign Reserves: 
Where'd it Come From?, QUARTZ (Oct. 15, 2013) http://qz.com/135340/chinas-central-bank-now-has-
3-66-trillion-in-foreign-reserves-but-whered-it-come-from/. 
 93. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 46. 
 94. See Is China Mercantilist?, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
http://www.nber.org/digest/dec05/w11306.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).  
 95. See Morrison, supra note 25. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Anti-China critics contend that China’s currency manipulation is a type 
of unfair trade practice that exposes China to trade sanctions in the form of 
increased tariffs imposed on Chinese imports that enter the United States. 
As elaborated above, some critics charge that Chinese imports enjoy a 30-
45% percent price advantage created by China’s devaluation of its 
currency. This price advantage has the same effect as a subsidy, long 
prohibited by Article XVI of GATT 1947,99 the original article on 
subsidies, and later elaborated in the 1994 WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures.100  
A simple definition of a subsidy is a financial payment by a 
government to domestic firms to encourage exports (other types subsidies 
also exist).101 A subsidy is considered to be a trade distortion because it is 
an intervention, caused by government action, in the free market. A basic 
goal of the WTO is to promote free trade and to discourage or eliminate 
government intervention into the market because this creates a distortion 
that undermines free trade.102 Free trade and competition between firms 
that enjoy success in trade is achieved through market efficiencies. Firms 
that produce high quality goods more efficiently and at a lower cost will 
succeed in international trade to the detriment of their weaker competitors. 
Government intervention into the market distorts efficiencies because the 
intervention gives weaker firms an advantage based on an artificial 
assistance, not based on intrinsic efficiencies of the firm. Take the classic 
example of a government export subsidy. In its simplest form, a 
government provides a payment to a firm to export a product to a foreign 
market.103 Let us suppose that the Chinese government makes a payment 
of 50 USD on each product exported to the United States. The payment of 
50 USD lowers the cost of production of the export and the exporter is 
now able to pass on the savings to the U.S. consumer by charging a lower 
price by the amount of 50 USD. This lower price provides a competitive 
advantage that has nothing to do with the efficiencies of the exporter, but 
is a result of the financial contribution or assist by the Chinese 
government. The subsidy not only helps an inefficient producer but also 
 
 
 99. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194.  
 100. See SCM, supra note 41, art. 3.  
 101. SCM, supra note 41, arts. 1-4. 
 102. See Understanding the WTO: Basics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (discussing the goal of the WTO to 
achieve free trade). 
 103. This is an example of an export subsidy, considered to be the most harmful of subsidies and 
strictly prohibited under SCM Article 4. 
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harms more efficient producers in the United States that are unable to 
compete on price due to the 50 USD subsidy given by the Chinese 
government. These firms are harmed and may be driven out from the 
market. At this point, the Chinese company can raise its prices or lower 
the quality of the goods, both of which produce the same result: the U.S. 
consumer and U.S. industry are harmed. This scenario is why some 
subsidies are viewed as predatory and illegal as an unfair trade practice; it 
distorts free trade and can produce harm to the multilateral trading system 
to consumers and domestic industries alike.104  
Anti-China critics argue that the effect of China’s currency devaluation 
of the RMB has the same or similar economic effect as a subsidy. By 
using an artificially low exchange rate, the Chinese government is 
intervening in the market by allowing fewer USD to be exchanged for 
RMB so that the U.S. consumer is paying less for the Chinese import. The 
price advantage for the less expensive Chinese import is not created by 
market efficiencies of the firm but by government intervention. As one 
remedy for an illegal subsidy is the imposition of a countervailing duty 
that offsets the effect of the subsidy,105 the argument by anti-China critics 
is that the same remedy should apply in the case of Chinese currency 
manipulation: a countervailing duty of 45% on all Chinese imports should 
be imposed to offset the effect of the subsidy.106 The countervailing duty is 
an extra tariff that will increase the cost of the Chinese import to the U.S. 
consumer by 45% to its “real” price and will level the playing field for 
U.S. goods and U.S. businesses.  
III. TRADE SANCTIONS FOR SUBSIDIES UNDER THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
A. Tariffs and Trade Sanctions 
To understand how trade sanctions are imposed under the World Trade 
Organization, it is necessary to understand the history of the WTO and its 
predecessor organizations. In the 1930s, the period leading up to the 
Second World War, nations had unlimited discretion to impose trade 
sanctions on goods from other nations at any level and at any time.107 No 
international legal organization or system existed that had authority to 
 
 
 104. The example given in the text of an export subsidy is widely considered to be the most 
harmful of all types of subsidies and is considered to be illegal per se under the WTO. See SCM, supra 
note 41, art. IV. 
 105. SCM, supra note 41, art. 4. 
 106. See Morrongiello, supra note 4. 
 107. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 18. 
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limit trade sanctions.108 In the absence of an international regime such as 
the WTO, nations could impose any level of trade sanction at any time and 
the only recourse for a trade sanction imposed by one nation on another 
was tit-for-tat: retaliatory sanction in return.109 This was clearly an 
unsatisfactory and dangerous state of affairs, as nations began to use trade 
tactics that led to ever-higher tariffs, which created insurmountable trade 
barriers, a hostile trading environment, and hostile relations.110 The United 
States was a leading proponent of trade sanctions as evidenced by the 
Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which imposed tariffs that averaged 
53% of the value of imports.111 Such draconian tariffs were viewed as an 
attempt to prevent trade but still achieved this objective.112 The draconian 
tariffs engendered mistrust and ill will among nations as they viewed each 
other as adversaries, not as allies.113 A lesson from this chaotic period is 
that when nations view each other with hostility in their economic 
relations, military conflict is often not too far behind.114 One of the results 
of the Second World War was that nations wanted to put into place multi-
lateral institutions that would avoid the economic conflict that contributed 
to the Second World War.115 Near the end of the war, as it became clear 
that Germany and Japan would be defeated, a group of nations led by the 
United States met at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to 
establish a multilateral framework to prevent the disastrous economic 
policies that contributed to the global catastrophe created by the Second 
World War from occurring again.116  
One of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the GATT 1947, was 
established expressly for the purposes of putting a limit on the power of 
nations to impose trade sanctions on other nations without justification.117 
 
 
 108. The Bretton Woods conference established the triumvirate of modern international financial 
institutions (the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF), which had no precedent in history. CHOW, supra 
note 7, at 18. 
 109. The WTO has strict rules that must be satisfied before a nation can impose a trade sanction. 
CHOW, supra note 7, at 448-450 (discussing U.S. implementation of WTO antidumping procedures). 
Without the discipline of the WTO, nations could simply impose any type of trade sanction they 
wished. Under the WTO, a nation suffering from an illegal trade sanction has recourse to the WTO 
system for the settlement of trade disputes. CHOW, supra note 7, at 63.  
 110. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing the mutual use of draconian tariffs to prevent 
trade, leading to mounting economic and political tensions and contributing to the eruption of the 
Second World War). 
 111. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 18. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 26. 
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The GATT sought, as a major goal, to end the ability of nations from 
arbitrarily imposing trade sanctions in the form of high tariffs on other 
nations. The GATT 1947 (and later the WTO established in 1995) viewed 
arbitrary and unpredictable tariffs as creating an unworkable system for 
world trade. The founders of the GATT 1947 did not seek to immediately 
eliminate all tariffs; they were political realists and accepted that some 
level of tariffs had to be permitted under the GATT 1947, as a matter of 
historical necessity.118 The most common form of tariff is the ad valorem 
tariff, which is expressed as a tax on a percentage of the value of the 
import, i.e. 5% of the value of the import, usually imposed on the actual 
price paid of the import at the port of entry before the import can enter the 
internal market.119 
As the public debates concerning China’s currency manipulation and 
China’s other trade issues focuses on tariffs, most of the discussion below 
focuses on tariffs that are imposed as an added trade sanction under the 
WTO. We start with a basic trade rule contained in GATT Article II.120 
Under GATT Article II:1(b), each GATT /WTO country (including the 
United States) establishes a GATT schedule with tariff rates for all 
goods.121 These tariff schedules are reached after long rounds of 
negotiations in which agreement on mutually acceptable schedules is 
reached with all other GATT/WTO members.122 Each GATT member 
makes an “offer” of its tariff schedule to all GATT members on all tariffs 
to be charged on imports and then negotiates with every other member of 
the GATT/WTO on all tariffs until an agreement is reached on mutually 
satisfactory tariffs.123 These negotiations can take years and are on-
going.124 Once agreement on a GATT schedule is reached, the nation’s 
 
 
 118. Id. at 26.  
 119. CHOW, supra note 7, at 180. This is known as the ad valorem tariff, expressed as a 
percentage of the value of the import. Other tariffs are a specific tariff, i.e. a flat rate, a mixed tariff 
that combines aspects of the ad valorem tariff and the specific tariff. Finally, a popular tariff is the 
tariff rate quota, which imposes one tariff for the in-quota amount (i.e. up to a certain quantity of 
imports) and a higher amount for the out-of quota amount (i.e. above the designated amount for the in-
quota rate). There are other types of trade barriers but the tariff is by the far the most popular and so is 
the main focus of the discussion in the text. 
 120. See GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. II.   
 121.  Id., art. II:1(b). 
 122. Goods Schedules: Members’ Commitments, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm ; see also CHOW, supra 
note 7, at 182 (GATT “tariff schedules are usually reached after lengthy negotiations with all other 
WTO members.”).  
 123. See ANWARUL HODA, TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GATT AND 
THE WTO: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 12 (2001); see also GATT Bilateral Negotiating Material by 
Round, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattbilaterals_e/ 
indexbyround_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 124. CHOW, supra note 7, at 49-50.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:295 
 
 
 
 
GATT schedule is then attached under GATT Article II:1(a) to the GATT 
Agreement as an official annex that becomes part of the GATT/WTO.125 
Once a nation’s GATT schedule with a tariff rate for all imports are 
established, the nation’s GATT schedule cannot be modified without 
undergoing some elaborate and lengthy procedures.126  
Under GATT Article II:1(b), a nation cannot impose tariffs that exceed 
the tariffs on its GATT schedule.127 In other words, the tariffs are “bound,” 
i.e. subject to a ceiling above which the tariff cannot exceed.128 If a nation 
imposes a tariff above the “bound” rate, the nation is in violation of GATT 
Article II:1(b) and must withdraw the tariff or else face consequences 
under the GATT dispute settlement system, which has proven to be an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism. The dispute settlement system 
includes, among other remedies, the ability of the WTO to authorize trade 
sanctions against the offending country.129 After the initial tariff schedules 
were established in 1947, GATT countries engaged in a series of 
multilateral rounds of negotiations to further reduce tariffs.130 By all 
accounts, GATT tariff negotiations have been a resounding success and 
current tariff rates are far below their historical highs.131  
The most significant aspect of GATT Article II:1(b) is that it 
establishes a bedrock principle of international trade that abolishes the 
ruinous chaos and anarchy that existed prior to the Second World War. 
From the GATT 1947 onward, tariffs to be imposed on imports are bound 
by a ceiling in a nation’s GATT schedule; tariffs cannot exceed the ceiling 
by any amount, no matter how de minimis, without violating a 
fundamental WTO legal obligation.132 Moreover, tariffs cannot be 
 
 
 125. See GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. II:1(a). 
 126. See id., art. XXVIII (Modification of Schedules). The modification of an applicant’s GATT 
schedule requires undergoing a negotiating process with all of the original WTO members that agreed 
to the applicant’s GATT schedule as well as any other members so designated by the WTO 
membership as having an interest in the modification. The negotiations must be conducted I according 
with time period specified by a two thirds vote of the WTO membership and are subject to the 
achievement of goals within strict mandatory time guidelines within the overall time period.  See art. 
XXVII: 1, 3(a),-(b), 4(a)-(d), 5. See also CHOW, supra note 7, at 182 (“[N]o WTO member may act 
unilaterally to change its tariff bindings, but must follow a complicated procedure.”). 
 127. See Chow, supra note 7, at 182 (“GATT Article II:1(a) and II:1(b) provide that a member 
cannot impose a tariff that is higher than provided for in tis tariff schedule.”). 
 128. Id. (discussing how GATT Article II “bind” nations to “ceilings” on tariffs). 
 129. Id. at 68. 
 130. Id. at 50-51. 
 131.  Id. at 180. 
 132. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. II:1(b); see also Report of the Appellate Body, Argentina-
Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WTO Doc. WT/DS/AB/R 
at ¶ 46 (March 27, 1998) (“A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the 
amount of duty that may be imposed …. The Principal obligation in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) 
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disguised as some other type of charge to evade the bound rate.133 The 
starting presumption is that all tariffs are absolutely bound by the GATT 
tariff ceiling.134 No tariff (or a disguised tariff) exceeding the GATT 
schedule can be imposed;135 if an additional tariff is to be imposed, it can 
be done so only in exceptional circumstances and only if the importing 
nation can satisfy the burden of proving the additional tariff is an 
established exception, as set forth in certain provisions of the GATT or the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.136 The clear 
presumption is in favor of the GATT rate and exceeding the GATT rate 
through increased tariffs in the form of sanctions is only exceptionally 
permitted.137 In the case of the United States, the applicable GATT 
Schedule is contained in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (HTSUS).138 As the U.S. GATT schedule, the HTSUS sets the 
ceiling on all tariffs that can be lawfully imposed on foreign imports. No 
tariff can be imposed by the United States on Chinese imports that exceed 
the HTSUS rate, unless the United States carries the burden of justifying 
the additional tariff based upon a text of the WTO.139  
B. Tariff Sanctions for Currency Manipulation  
The justification offered by the United States for the extra tariff above 
 
 
. . . requires a Member to refrain from imposing ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided in 
the Member’s Schedule.”)  
 133. GATT Article II:1(b) states that other than being subject to the GATT bound tariffs, imports 
“shall be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth [in the GATT schedule]. 
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind . . . . “). The last phrase 
exempting imports from all other duties or charges of any kind prevents nations from circumventing 
the ceiling imposed on all import tariffs by the member’s GATT schedule by referring to additional 
tariffs as other duties or charges. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. II:1(b). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. For the purposes of this article, the most important exception is the imposition of 
countervailing duties to offset the effect of an illegal subsidy. See GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. 
XVI; see also SCM, supra note 41, arts. 1-3 (setting forth the requirements of an illegal subsidy). 
There are also other exceptions, most notably the general exceptions provision in GATT 1994, art. 
XX, a very important provision, but a discussion of Art. XX is beyond the scope of this article.  
 137. This rule can be gleaned from the structure of the GATT. Article II:1(a)-(b) set ceilings on 
the import tariff while other provisions of the GATT and its related agreements, authorized additional 
tariffs in the form of trade sanctions only if certain strict conditions are met. For example, Article I of 
the WTO Antidumping Agreement states: “An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the 
circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.”  
 138. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUBL’N NO. 4622, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE 
U.S. (2016).  
 139.   For example, in the case of a countervailing duty to offset the effect of an illegal subsidy 
provided to an imported good, the U.S. must demonstrate that the subsidy meets the requirements of 
SCM Articles 1-3 in order to justify the imposition of the countervailing duty. 
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the tariff set forth in the United States GATT schedule is based on GATT 
Article XVI,140 the original subsidies article that was elaborated in the 
1994 WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.141 If the 
United States can prevail on this argument then the extra tariff, which 
President Trump says should be as high as 45%,142 can be justified and 
permitted under the WTO. In other words, the United States will be able to 
impose a 45% countervailing duty across the board on every single 
Chinese import that enters the United States.143 Whether this is a legal 
possibility depends on an analysis of the relevant texts of the WTO. 
C. GATT Article XVI and the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement 
In assessing the legal arguments below, it is necessary to begin with the 
premise that the WTO General Council, the permanent standing 
membership of the WTO and its highest body, wears different hats. 
Wearing its hat as the Dispute Settlement Body that resolves trade 
disputes, the WTO General Council is a body that review opinions of 
WTO panels and the Appellate body that are highly technical, decided 
after painstaking parsing and exegesis of the legal texts of the WTO.144 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is not concerned with social or 
economic policies that may have a similar or equivalent legal effect to 
illegal measures, such as prohibited subsidies. That currency manipulation 
may have some effects that are similar to subsidies will carry no weight 
with the WTO; the issue is one of law in a dispute settlement proceeding, 
not policy. Rather, the technical legal issue for the WTO is whether 
China’s currency manipulation meets the definition of a subsidy as defined 
in the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement so as to 
justify the imposition of countervailing duties on Chinese imports.  
The relevant provision of the SCM Agreement, which elaborates the 
original GATT XVI on countervailing duties, defines a subsidy in relevant 
 
 
 140. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. XVI. This was the original article recognizing the 
availability of anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to offset the unfair trade practices of 
dumping and subsidies. The WTO subsequently believed that it was necessary to elaborate on GATT 
1994, art. XVI and so passed two new agreements the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and the WTO 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. As the SCM Agreement is much more elaborate, 
the discussion in the text focuses on the SCM. 
 141. See SCM, supra note 41. 
 142. Morrongiello, supra note 4.  
 143. Id.  
 144. The technical nature of WTO panels and Appellate Body opinions are apparently to any 
reader of these opinions. See generally CHOW, supra note 7. 
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part as follows: 
Article 1 
Definition of a Subsidy 
1.1. For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed 
to exist if: 
(a)(1) There is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member . . . i.e. where: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. 
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds 
or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or 
entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the 
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would 
normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real 
sense differs from practices normally followed by governments. 
and 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.145 
An actionable subsidy under the SCM is subject to unilateral action in the 
form of the imposition of a countervailing duty by the importing country 
on the subsidized imports.146 Such relief is based on whether a subsidy is 
found. The key issue is whether currency manipulation fits within the 
definition of a subsidy.  
1. “Financial Contribution” 
A reading of SCM Article 1 indicates that its purpose is to prohibit 
governments from making a “financial contribution,” i.e. a payment (in the 
form of a direct transfer of funds, grants, loans and equity infusion, loan 
guarantees) to a firm. The key prohibition is against payments, i.e. the 
 
 
 145. SCM, supra note 41, art. 1.  
 146. Id. art. 19.1.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:295 
 
 
 
 
transfer of funds directly or indirectly by the government to the firm. That 
is the crux of a subsidy as defined in the SCM.  
No payment from a government to a firm is involved in a devaluation 
of currency. Devaluation is a government economic policy used to manage 
a country’s foreign currency reserves, balance of payment obligations, and 
financial stability.147 Devaluation affects the flow of currency within the 
nation as a means of payment and in countries abroad.148 There are no 
payments directly or indirectly from the government to the firm.  
SCM Article 1.1(a)(iii), set forth above, deserves special discussion. 
This provision refers to a subsidy as government revenue that is otherwise 
foregone. One could make the argument that a devaluation of the Chinese 
currency is revenue foregone to Chinese banks since fewer dollars are 
needed for currency exchange for RMB. But SCM Article 1.1(a)(iii) is not 
concerned just about revenue not collected by the government. This 
provision is designed to capture the situation where a private business firm 
owes the government money, taxes, or debts and the government forgoes 
the money, i.e. does not collect it from the firm. In other words, SCM 
Article 1.1(a) presupposes that the private firm owes revenue to the 
government and that the government forgives the debt owed. The 
forgiveness is a type of subsidy. If a company owes the China $50 million 
and the PRC government forgives the debt, the forgiveness has the same 
effect as the firm receives a payment of $50 million from the PRC 
government. The key concept is the government gives the payment to the 
firm or the government forgives the obligation owed by the firm to the 
government, which has exactly the same economic effect. The failure by 
Chinese banks to collect additional funds from foreign buyers exchanging 
foreign currency for RMB is not revenue that would be otherwise 
collected by the government from the firm. No debt or revenue due from 
the Chinese firm to the Chinese government is forgiven. The Chinese firm 
never owed any debts or taxes to the Chinese government in the first 
place.  
2. A “Benefit” is Conferred 
A second requirement of a subsidy is contained in Article 1.1(b) above. 
 
 
 147.  See COLLINS DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS, supra note 10, for the definition of devaluation.  
 148.  Id. (“The effect of a devaluation is to make IMPORTS (in the local currency) more 
expensive, thereby reducing import demand, and EXPORTS (in the local currency) cheaper, thereby 
acting as a stimulus to export demand.”). 
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A subsidy must confer a “benefit.”149 In this context, a “benefit” means 
that the private firm is gaining an advantage that is not otherwise available 
on the market. For example, the government makes a gratuitous payment 
to a private firm, the government buys goods from the firm at above 
market prices, does not collect taxes owed by the firm, or forgoes a loan or 
debt owed by the private firm; none of these is a normal business practice 
available on the market in the ordinary course of business. In other words, 
the government is giving special and favorable treatment to the private 
firm, the type of help that is not available through normal commercial 
channels. The government is intervening into the market place and is 
creating a market distortion, i.e. a benefit not earned by the efficiencies of 
the firm but by the largess of the government. None of these elements 
exists in the case of currency devaluation. By definition, currency 
devaluation does not create a special benefit available to a selected few 
that is generally not available on the market.150 To the contrary, the 
currency devaluation is available to every firm or individual on the market 
dealing with foreign currency. Because no benefit beyond what is 
available on the market is conferred, no benefit exists within the meaning 
of SCM Article 1.1(b). Without a benefit conferred, no subsidy exists 
under SCM Art. 1.1(b). 
3. “Specificity”  
A third requirement of a subsidy is that it must be “specific.”151 The 
requirement of specificity is explicitly set forth in SCM Article 2: a 
subsidy must be “specific to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises of industries (referred to in this Agreement as ‘certain 
enterprises’).”152 The reason for the requirement of specificity is that all 
governments provide general infrastructure services to their constituents as 
part of their sovereign functions. For example, governments build 
highways, roads, bridges, parks, and other public works that benefit the 
public. These works confer services that are provided to private firms to 
carry out their businesses as well as to members of the public who use the 
same public works for business or non-business reasons. The public works 
do not distinguish between users, as these are public goods available to all. 
 
 
 149. SCM, supra note 41, art. 1.1(b). 
 150.  A currency devaluation is an adjustment of the exchange rate of the domestic currency 
versus the foreign currency. See supra Part III.C. This exchange rate would be available to any 
business or person that wishes to obtain foreign currency in the country of devaluation. 
 151. SCM, supra note 41, art. 2.  
 151. Id. art. 1. 
 152.  Id. art. 2. 
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If these public infrastructure works were to be considered subsidies, then 
governments that provide subsidies all the time and all public works could 
be subject to countervailing subsidies.  The result would seem 
unacceptable.  
In order to distinguish general infrastructure from prohibited subsidies, 
the SCM requires that the public work or infrastructure must be specific to 
an industry or group of enterprises and not available to the general 
public.153 For example, a government might build a bridge or a road for the 
exclusive use of a private factory. Now this infrastructure becomes a 
subsidy that is specific to the factory. The road also confers a benefit as 
the factory would have to build such a road on its own if the government 
did not do so. Under these circumstances, the infrastructure could be 
treated as a subsidy, and the cost of providing a replacement work could 
represent the amount of the subsidy that is subject to the imposition of a 
countervailing duty. 
China’s currency devaluations, however, do not meet this definition of 
specificity. No one can argue that China’s currency devaluations are 
specific to a single enterprise or group of enterprises.154 Rather, the 
devalued currency exchange rates are available to all firms and 
individuals. Subsidies that are not specific are not illegal or actionable 
under the SCM.155 
If currency devaluations do not meet the definition of a subsidy under 
the SCM, then there is no justification the imposition of a countervailing 
duty on all Chinese goods imported into the United States. Any imposition 
of such a countervailing duty would be illegal under the SCM and would 
be subject to being struck down by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
IV. THE IMF IS THE PROPER FORUM IN WHICH TO ASSERT A CLAIM OF 
CURRENCY MANIPULATION 
A second argument that the SCM cannot be used to impose 
countervailing duties on currency manipulation can be traced from the 
history and the design for the triumvirate of multilateral financial 
 
 
 153.  See supra notes 148 and accompanying text 
 154. One might be able to make an argument, if supported by the evidence, that a large number of 
export firms use currency devaluations. For example, suppose that it is possible to show that 70% of 
all export firms use the lower currency exchange on a regular basis. At this point, one might find that 
this is a de facto specific subsidy. Even if such a case could be made, however, there is still the 
problem that the government has made no financial contribution as required by SCM Article 1 so the 
argument that a subsidy exists still fails. 
 155. SCM, supra note 41, arts. 1-2.  
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institutions set in place more than seventy years ago at the conference in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.156 When the United States and other 
nations met at the Bretton Woods Conference, they had a specific plan for 
the new economic order for the post-war period. The GATT was to 
liberalize trade in goods and to lower trade barriers to jumpstart the global 
trade in goods.157 The World Bank was to lend money for the 
reconstruction of Europe and to least developing countries.158 It was left to 
the International Monetary Fund to deal with currency issues, including 
the issue of currency devaluation.159 In the period before the Second 
World War, nations engaged in a vicious series of currency devaluations 
that harmed their trading partners. The IMF was intended to curb these 
devaluations as part of its work of dealing with currency manipulations.160 
In its initial charge, the IMF was to encourage the free convertibility of 
currencies through the use of stable exchange rates, discourage currency 
devaluations, and provide loans and technical assistance so as to aid 
countries in their balance of payment problems.161 Disputes between 
nations concerning currency devaluations were to be resolved by dialogue. 
Article IV:1 of the Articles of the Agreement of the IMF states that 
members “shall avoid manipulating [currency] exchanges in order to gain 
an unfair advantage over other members.”162 Note the precatory language 
“shall.” In the entire history of the IMF, no country has ever been found to 
be a currency manipulator in violation of this provision. 163 This history 
has led one commentator to argue that this provision is “soft law,” i.e. an 
aspirational goal, not a binding rule of law.164 Given this history, it seems 
 
 
 156. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 18-21. 
 157. Id. at 26. 
 158. Id. at 19. 
 159. Id. at 19-21. 
 160. Beyond affecting trade balances, currency devaluations can have serious harmful effects on 
the nation holding the devalued currency. Devaluations were a real problem in the period prior to War 
World II, and the IMF was tasked with controlling the harmful effects of devaluations. Here is an 
example of how harmful devaluations can be: 
If Country B is holding large amounts of Country A’s currency and Country A suddenly 
devalues its currency by 50 percent, Country B’s holdings of Country A’s currency 
immediately deceases in value by one-half and Country B may feel cheated. Assume that the 
original exchange rate for A’s currency in B’s currency is 1:1 so that one unit of A’s currency 
can be exchanged for one unit of B’s currency. If Country A devalues its currency by 50 
percent, the exchange rate for A’s currency becomes 2:1 so that two units of A’s currency 
must now be exchanged for one unit of B’s currency. Country B’s holdings of A’s currency 
have just decreased by half. 
CHOW, supra note 7, at 20 & n.9. 
 161. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
 162. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. 4, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.  
 163. See Claus D. Zimmermann, Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law, 105 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 423, 426 (2011).  
 164. See id.  
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unlikely that the IMF will find China guilty of currency manipulation. 
Even if the IMF finds China to be to a currency manipulator, that 
conclusion would not justify the imposition of countervailing duties by the 
United States. This is made clear by GATT Article XV:2, which 
elaborates the relationship between the GATT/WTO and the IMF: 
In all cases in which the contracting parties are called upon to 
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, 
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall 
consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such 
consultations, the contacting parties [the GATT parties] shall 
accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the 
Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances 
of payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to 
action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance 
with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund…(emphasis added).165 
GATT Article XV: 2 indicates that it is the IMF, not the GATT/WTO, 
which was given authority over currency exchange issues. The domain of 
the IMF is currency regulations and whereas the domain of the GATT is 
trade in goods. The argument that the United States should use the SCM 
Agreement to impose countervailing duties on China for currency 
manipulation has no basis in the texts of the WTO or in its historical 
origins. Imposing countervailing duties would be using the enforcement 
powers of one organization, the GATT, to enforce matters that are within 
the jurisdiction of an entirely different organization with a different 
mandate, the IMF. To create this arrangement, there must be an agreement 
authorizing “cross retaliation.” There is no existing agreement between the 
IMF and the WTO for “cross retaliation,” and thus no legal basis on which 
such an arrangement can be justified. 
The IMF’s authority over currency issues creates a problem for the 
United States because the IMF lacks any enforcement powers. The IMF is 
limited to working with countries in resolving currency disputes through 
promoting dialogue, surveillance, technical assistance, and persuasion.166 
The IMF can also provide loans and technical assistance to help countries 
make their payment obligations.167 Other than these powers, the IMF has 
 
 
 165. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. XV:2. 
 166. See About the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
about.htm (last visited November 11, 2016). 
 167. See id. 
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no other authority to deal with currency issues.168  
V. RETALIATION FOR U.S. SANCTIONS FOR CURRENCY MANIPULATION 
Even if the United States is able to impose trade sanctions in the form 
of countervailing duties on China for currency manipulation, China might 
retaliate in kind. China is not the only country that intervenes in currency 
markets. The United States also intervenes in currency markets on a 
regular basis by buying up USD in order to prop up the dollar from 
devaluation and to maintain stability in financial markets.169 Interventions 
by the United States are common monetary measures that almost all 
nations engage in and are within the domain of the IMF.170 This was one 
of the reasons for including currency regulations in the IMF, not the 
GATT; no one wants a trade war every time a nation intervenes in a 
currency market. 
The United States could argue that its actions are different from 
China’s since the United States is not pegging the USD to a basket of 
currencies in the way that China does and the United States does not 
systemically devalue its currency in order to support exports. But when 
trade disputes erupt, these types of distinctions are not going to be 
persuasive, especially to countries that have been unfairly targeted for 
especially harsh treatment. Once the United States opens the door by 
arguing that currency manipulation constitutes a subsidy, the same 
argument will be applied against the United States, even though there 
might be some differences in how the United States intervenes in the 
currency market. Whatever the merits of the U.S. argument for the 
imposition of countervailing duties on imports from China, there is a high 
likelihood that an across-the-board tariff of 45% will be met with a fierce 
and angry response by China leading to the possibility of a trade war 
between the world’s two largest economies that could destabilize the 
world. Other Asian countries might also wish to exploit the opportunity to 
impose countervailing duties against the United States in order to avoid 
trade imbalances with the United States.  
In pressing the currency manipulation argument against China, the 
United States risks opening itself up to retaliatory measures and a costly 
diplomatic dispute with China and possibly with other countries. This risk 
alone is a practical reason that cautions against the use of trade sanctions 
for currency manipulation. 
 
 
 168. See id. 
 169. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK supra note 54. 
 170. See supra Part IV. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The argument that the United States should impose trade sanctions on 
China to offset its currency manipulation is not supported by a sound legal 
basis.171 The text of the WTO does not support such a remedy, the 
architecture of the post-war set of financial institutions does not support it, 
and as a matter of trade policy (aside from questions of legality), imposing 
trade sanctions would be a risky move.172 The question that arises for the 
United States is what responses are available if countervailing duties are 
not lawful. 
At the outset, let us first dispense with the unrealistic options, such as 
amending U.S. trade federal law to authorize for the use of countervailing 
duties against Chinese imports for currency manipulation. The United 
States is a member of the WTO and has a legal obligation to implement 
WTO obligations into U.S. law.173 Changes in federal law that are 
inconsistent with the SCM, the GATT and other WTO agreements are 
illegal, as they will be rejected in the WTO dispute settlement system.174 
Any attempts to evade WTO law by changing domestic laws would be 
futile and would be immediately struck down in the WTO dispute 
settlement system.175 Let us also be clear that there is no realistic 
possibility of amending the GATT/WTO agreements to allow for the use 
of countervailing duties against China for currency manipulation. Changes 
to the GATT/WTO and the SCM require the unanimous consent of all 
GATT/WTO members.176 China’s opposition alone would be sufficient to 
defeat such efforts.177 Equally quixotic would be suggesting that the 
Articles of the IMF be amended or reinterpreted so that the “soft law” 
against currency manipulation becomes “hard law” to be backed by newly 
created IMF sanctions. History indicates the IMF lacks the political will to 
find nations guilty of currency manipulation. 
 
 
 171. See supra Part III.  
 172. Id. 
 173. See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art 16.4, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S 14, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (Stating that members of the WTO, which include the 
United States, will ensure their domestic policies and laws conform with the annexed agreements 
entered into through their membership in the WTO).  
 174. See CHOW, supra note 7, at 63-68. 
 175. Id. at 63-68. 
 176. The WTO operates on the basis of the principle of consensus, i.e. decisions are made with the 
consent of all members. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. 
9.1., Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. “The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by 
consensus followed under the GATT 1947.” Id. 
 177. China’s opposition would be alone sufficient to destroy the consensus required under Art. 
IX:1. See generally CHOW, supra note 7, at 169. 
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A new strategy that the United States seems to have adopted is to 
create new mega-free trade agreements at a level below the WTO 
agreements. A preeminent example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
("TPP"), which was negotiated by the United States with its members 
while deliberating excluding China.178 The TPP imposes WTO plus 
obligations and there is no reason why similar mega-free trade agreements, 
drafted without China’s participation, could not include restrictions on 
currency manipulations. Once the free trade agreements are concluded, 
then China could be allowed to join, but it must accept all of the 
provisions in the agreement, including currency manipulation provisions. 
The United States drafted the TPP because it felt that China had not lived 
up to its WTO obligations.179 The same approach might work with 
currency obligations on the grounds that China has also not lived up to its 
IMF obligations. In other words, the United States might be able to 
remedy the oversight in the Bretton Woods Conference by using regional 
free trade agreements to impose “IMF plus” discipline on currency 
manipulation. To remedy defects or oversights in the IMF, the GATT, and 
the WTO is to create binding legal obligations in multilateral treaties (i.e. 
at a level below the supranational level of WTO agreements). The “IMF 
plus” obligations could treat currency manipulation as an unfair trade 
practice equivalent to a subsidy and open to sanctions, such as the 
imposition of a countervailing subsidy. The carrot for joining such an 
agreement is increased trade opportunities for China as in the case of the 
TPP;180 the stick is “WTO plus” and “IMF plus” obligations that close 
loopholes that have existed since 1947. 
In pursuing an “IMF plus” strategy, similar to the “WTO plus” strategy 
exemplified by the TPP, the United States needs to proceed on the basis 
that China is a sharp competitor that will press the rules of international 
trade and any loopholes to their limits in order to exploit all advantages in 
its favor.181 China sees nothing wrong with this approach and is 
unapologetic about it; after all, China sees itself as playing by rules largely 
written by the United States in its role as the major driving force behind 
 
 
 178. See generally Chow, supra note 84.  
 179. See id. at 374; see also WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. 
TRADE ISSUES 20 (2015) (stating that China has a mixed record in implementing WTO obligations and 
listing specific examples of instances when the U.S. has challenged Chinese policies as failing to fulfill 
WTO obligations). 
 180. See Chow, supra note 84, at 375 (noting that the TPP, like all preferential trade agreements, 
will “increase trade among [its] members” and that not being a member of the TPP could lead to losses 
in trade opportunities). 
 181.  See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, 49 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1255 (2016) (discussing how China is inflicting a decisive 
defeat in international trade on the United States).  
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the Bretton Woods institutions. The United States needs to proceed on the 
basis that trade relations between the two countries have become a high 
stakes game of moves and countermoves by two countries that treat each 
other more like adversaries than allies. The goal of each is to gain strategic 
advantage at the expense of the other in order to secure its role as the 
leading global trading power of the twenty-first century.182183 
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